SUBJECTIVIZATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND ACT: BIRTH, SUBMISSION, AND RE-BIRTH OF SUBJECTS IN A SYMBOLIC ORDER

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ABSTRACT

This study has taken into consideration Žižek views on the notion of fantasy and its function in controlling thoughts and influencing the public. All of contemplations on subject and its position in society are significant, but Žižek’s is a different one. To elaborate this notion more closely this study focuses on the birth and death of subjects in Žižekian perspective. Fantasy plays an important role in symbolic submission and identification. It provides the context for internalization of cultural norms through language and identification with figures of symbolic authority like Ego Ideal. The only way out of such subjugation is a radical traversing of the existing ideological regime, or act. This research shows that there is indeed for Žižek an intimate connection between symbolic identity and the founding imposition of language. Language is a powerful tool to form human behaviors, beliefs, and finally their identity within a symbolic order. The process of subject’s enslavement into language is called subjectivization by Žižek. The symbolic order continues its livelihood by identifying subjects with Ego Ideals in the field of fantasy. As Žižek announces the fantasy of a subject manages or domesticates the traumatic loss of enjoyment, which cannot be symbolized. In spite of subjectivization and identification, some subjects traverse their ideological fantasy and accept the nonexistence of the big Other. They explicitly challenge the founding assumptions of the existing ideological order, with its undergirding political fantasies.

Keywords: Žižek, Fantasy, Subjectivization, Identification, Act, Symbolic order.

Contribution/ Originality

This study contributes in the existing literature by providing a detailed account of how Žižek’s critical notions are inter-related to form a logical body of his thoughts.

1. INTRODUCTION

While studying Žižek, “one is simultaneously informed, edified, and entertained” (Sciullo, 2011); his courage and willingness to criticize leftist conventions and common sense is attractive
even when he is wrong, even when “his political judgment is questionable,” and even when “his taste is bad” (Hart, 2002). “With the publication of The Sublime Object of Ideology in 1989, Slavoj Žižek introduced a new understanding of Lacan, focused on the importance of the real to the English-speaking world” (McGowan, 2007). Hegel introduced a self-conscious subject in the external world; the core of his philosophy of phenomenology is the idea of intersubjectivity (Beiser, 1999). He refers to a self-transforming process, as a “reflection into self,” the “moment of the ‘I’,” or as “pure negativity” (1977). Post-structuralists reject the idea of cogito as a “completely self-contained being that develops in the world as an expression of its own unique essence” (Mansfield, 2000). Subjects are “constructed, made within the world, not born into it already formed” (ibid, p. 11), and consequently are “decentred subjects” (Myers, 2003). In other words, as Sim (2001) claims, postmodern subject is “a fragmented being who has no essential core of identity,” this subject is considered “as a process in a continual state of dissolution rather than a fixed identity or self that endures unchanged over time” (pp. 366-7). Lacan (2001) believes that this fragmentation manifests itself in the form of “images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body,” (p. 9)

Žižek’s works draw on three main areas of influence, philosophy, politics, and psychoanalysis. In each of these areas, Žižek is influenced by the writings of a single individual, “Georg Hegel in philosophy, Karl Marx in politics, and Jacques Lacan in psychoanalysis” (Myers 14). Because of this view, he is “the pioneer in the dissemination of this ‘real’ Lacan – a grasp of Lacan that captures the latter’s radicality as a (political) thinker in ways that no one prior to Žižek ever imagined” (McGowan, 2007). All of contemplations on subject and its position in society are significant, but Žižek’s is a different one. To elaborate this notion more closely this study focuses on the birth and death of subjects in Žižekian perspective. The discussion is multidimensional and offers a lot of material for socio-political interpretation. The wide area of Žižek’s theories directs the researcher to choose one or a few specific key concepts such as fantasy to explore in-depth. Therefore, It has taken into consideration Žižek views on the notion of fantasy and its function in controlling the mind of subjects from 1985 to the present day. Fantasy plays an important role in symbolic submission and identification. It provides the context for internalization of cultural norms through language and identification with figures of symbolic authority like Ego Ideal. The only way out of such subjugation is a radical traversing of the existing ideological regime, or act.

2. THEORISING FANTASY: A POST-LACANIAN THEORY OF DESIRE

According to Sharpe and Boucher (2010), one of the creators of German Idealism, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is the first one who influences Žižek. Hegel’s account of reality, as a whole revolutionized European philosophy, establishes him an important precursor to Continental philosophy and Marxism. For Hegel, only the whole is true; every phase or moment is partial, therefore, partially untrue. Myers (2003) believes that the influence of Marx can be detected in Žižek’s works as the motivation for a particular method of thinking, praxis. Defining ideology as the way in which individuals understand their relationship with society, Žižek makes his most telling contribution to the Marxist tradition. While Marxists’ focus on governing processes of communities was in favor of this definition, it had very little to present a viewpoint for looking at
labor forces and workers (Myers, 2003). As ideology concentrates on psychological processes of individual and collective minds, it seems essential to find a theory of these processes. The place where Žižek finds such a theory is in the work of Jacques Lacan.

Having been called “the most controversial psycho-analyst since Freud” (Macey, 1994), Lacan devises a three-part model of the human psyche: imaginary, symbolic, and Real, each part is called an order and interacts with others. According to Lacan (1998), in imaginary order between 6 to 18 months age, one literally sees himself in a mirror or metaphorically in mother’s image. The symbolic order is perhaps the most important of all the orders because its scope includes everything from language to law, containing all the social structures. Intrinsically, the symbolic organizes the main important part that is called reality. The third stage for Lacan is the Real order. The real order opposes to imaginary order and is exterior to the symbolic, too. While the symbolic order is formed by binary oppositions (i.e. presence/absence), the Real order includes no absence. Though the symbolic is a set of differentiated elements (signifiers) and introduces a cut in the real, the Real in itself is undifferentiated. The Real order territory is beyond language and resists symbolization absolutely. Lacan (1998) defines the Real as the impossible because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic, and impossible to be attained. Such endurance to symbolization leads the Real order to its traumatic quality. Žižek’s reworking of Political notions of introduces the concept of enjoyment into the political field. For this end, he concentrates on the prohibition, supervision, and direction of “the ways ideological formations work as economic of enjoyment.” Žižek proposes, “ideological formation is more than a set of different elements constituted as a set by virtue of a certain nodal point” (Glynos, 2001). Interpreting Žižek, Dean (2006) adds a further insight to our understanding of Žižekian ideology base on the concept of fantasy:

Ideology is more than a discursive formation that covers over the fundamental incompleteness and impossibility of society. Rather, what is crucial to an ideological formation is the fantasy that supports it, that is, the point of excessive, irrational enjoyment that accounts for the hold of an ideological edifice on the subject. Fantasy explains the incompleteness of society (that is, it accounts for the antagonism rupturing society) in a way that promises and produces enjoyment. (Žižek, 1995) Discourse analysis and ideology critique, then, can do little in and of themselves to change society. Real substantive change has to confront (Žižek uses the Lacanian term traverse) ideology’s underlying fantasy. (Dean, 2006)

In order to describe fantasy, Žižek concentrate on lacan’s memorable keynote, “desire is the desire of the other” (Žižek, 1991). In other words, “what sets our desire in motion, thus allowing us to construct those historically mediated fantasies that constitute what we perceive as our self, our unique identity, is always our radical indecision vis-à-vis the other’s desire” (Vighi and Feldner, 2007). Žižek believes:

Object petit a, as the object of fantasy, is that 'something in me more than myself on account of which I perceive myself as 'worthy of the Other's desire.' […] The desire 'realized' (staged) in fantasy is not the subject’s own, but the other’s desire:
fantasy, phantasmic formation, is an answer to the enigma of Che vuoi? - 'You’re saying this, but what do you really mean by saying it?' - which established the subject’s primordial, constitutive position. (Žižek, 1997a)

In other words, the subject is created against a permanent background of question that constantly addresses the subject’s relationship with external reality, inclusive of all is the big Other. This question bears in mind Lacan’s known term Che vuoi? (I.e. what do you want?). The most important problem here is that the subject is suspicious because he does not know what the Other really wants- its intentions and desires are unclear to him. In order to remove his own sense of incomprehension, the subject creates his own scenario. This scenario, which is the real answer to Che vuoi, is called a fantasy. It protects subjects from the confusion of not knowing what the Other really wants. Anyhow, it can be concluded that what is at stake in desire is not subject’s fantasy (what does subject want?), but the other’s fantasy (what does he/she want from me?) (ibid).

Žižek, for giving an example about this question, refers to the famous case of Freud’s little daughter’s fantasy for strawberry cakes. It is clear that our deeds are a direct emanation of our desires only if we understand “our desires are generally conceived as an answer to the bothering gaze of the Other.” In the case of Freud’s daughter, “the crucial feature is that while she was voraciously eating a strawberry cake, the little girl noticed how her parents were deeply satisfied by this spectacle, by seeing her fully enjoying it” (ibid, p. 9). Fantasy, then, is what Žižek terms intersubjective. What Žižek means by this is that fantasy is only produced by the interaction between subjects. Therefore, although fantasy is different in individuals, in itself it is always a product of an intersubjective situation (ibid, p. 11). Therefore, fantasy realizes the desire of the Other. The subject is not sure about the fantasy of others, but they seem to like her/him eating strawberry cake so she/he will therefore eat strawberry cake for satisfying their desire (Myers, p. 98). To set out Žižek’s notion of fantasy in more detail and in relation to the creation of subjects, the concentration will be on subjectivization, symbolic identification with Ego Ideal, and Žižekian act.

3. BIRTH OF A SUBJECT: SUBMISSION THROUGH SUBJECTIVIZATION

In Žižekian way, “fantasy is the means by which the gap between the upper and the lower levels of the ‘Graph of Desire’, or the inconsistency of the symbolic order, is closed (Boucher, 2008). When the body is signified, or symbolizes, it is castrated. In other words, if the subjects would like to enter into the universal medium of language, they will be sentenced to an indirect relation with the body "via the medium of language." Accordingly, "whereas before we enter language we are what Žižek terms pathological subjects, after we are immersed in language we are what he refers to as barred subjects" (Myers, p. 97). In substantially the same way, what is removed from the barred subject is precisely enjoyment, which is imperfectly materialized or incarnated. This enjoyment, as a category in the lower level, is strictly different from, or heterogeneous to, the upper level of the signifier. Word, or language, is the place where the subject is born; the Word announces the Birth of subject:

How, precisely, does the Word discharge the tension of the rotary motion, how does it mediate the antagonism between the contractive and
the expansive force? The Word is a *contraction in the guise of its very opposite, of an expansion*—that is to say, in pronouncing a word, the subject contracts his being outside himself; he 'coagulates' the core of his being in an external sign. In the (verbal) sign, I-as it were-find myself outside myself, I posit my unity outside myself, in a signifier which represents me. (Žižek, 1996)

However, always as a subject, one cannot avoid this irretrievable loss, for it is only because of this loss or birth that he actually becomes something rather than remains as nothing. For Žižek the upper level, the Real order, is Ground and is considered the world before subjects are split by language, and language-or the Word—is the medium by which subject is given a voice in the symbolic order. The process of birth or being subjected, or subjecting, to language and to the rest of the symbolic order is what Žižek calls subjectivization. In this birth, subjects moves from “rotary motion of the drives” in “a pre-symbolic antagonism” to the field of language (Žižek, 1997a). However, it seems a little problematic; if a subject finds himself outside of himself, he is no longer self-identical. The signifier that represents the subject is just that, a representation, but it is not actually him. The importance is that "his point is less that the founding of identity elides some preexisting alterity pertaining to the object than that the founding moment itself is excessive with regards to what it calls into being". In other words, for Žižek, this process birth is at once the "condition of possibility of linguistic and socio-political identity" (Sharpe, 2004). In fact, there is a structural relationship between subjectivization and the founding imposition of authority in symbolic order. In his reading of Hegel, Žižek claims that the birth is always the process of performing the authority of the big Other; therefore, the argumentation of this birth (subjectivization) ultimately do have a political attitude. Žižek adds:

> A name refers to an object because this object is called that - this impersonal form ('it is called') announces the dimension of the big Other beyond other subjects. The example evoked by Searle of speakers who know nothing of the object of which they are speaking and whose 'only intentional content might be that they are using the name to refer to what others are referring to it' [Searle] - indicates a necessary constituent of every 'normal' use of names in language as a social bond […] (Žižek, 1995).

This announcement – the attempt to fix something beyond the perceptions of world – cannot actually succeed in reflecting fully any thing outside of itself. While reading Hegel, Žižek agrees that there is a natural split between our understanding about the world and the world itself. Naming as a medium for symbolic birth is, according to Fredric Jameson, "emblematic of a certain kind of violence that human beings do to the world" (qtd. in (Parker, 2004)). The representation supposedly serves as a metaphysical intermediary between the subject and the object is already stricken by the permanent misrecognition (Pinkard, 1994). In the same way, Žižek sees Hegel as:

We can see, now, why Hegel is as far as possible from the evolutionist notion of the progressive development of in-itself into for-itself: the category of "in itself" is strictly correlative to "for us," i.e., for some
consciousness external to the thing-in-itself. To say that a clod of clay is "in itself" a pot equals saying that this pot is already present in the mind of the craftsman who will impose the form of pot on the clay. The current way of saying "under the right conditions the pupil will realize his potentials" is thus deceptive: when, in excuse of his failure to realize his potentials, we insist that "he would have realized them, if only the conditions had been right," we commit thereby an error of cynicism. (Žižek, 1993)

In the fourth chapter of *For They Know Not What They Do*, Žižek (2002) points out that subjects feeling that their words refers to objects independently of the fact that they happen is a false interpretation social generation and sanctioning of meaning in their birth. He adds, realisation of the Real is impossible and that the use of words involves following the standards that presuppose and embody the existence of a sanctioning linguistic community (pp. 141-78).

In spite of the view on the formation of post-structuralist subject, for Žižek, subjectivization needs to be conceived as a two-way process. On the one hand, the symbolic order, or the big Other, dominates subjects and gives them birth. For example, we were born in a family and carry that family’s name, occupy a specific socio-economic position, follow a particular religion, and so on. On the other hand, as an incomplete entity, the symbolic Order is constituted by a lack (because of castration); thus, the way in which subjects integrate these elements of the symbolic and narrate them is theirs. For example, we might disown our family, change our name, invent a new religion, and so on. This ambiguous status of relationship between symbolic order and subjects is revealed in Žižek’s commentary on the replicants in Scott (1982):

Despite the fact that their most intimate memories are not 'true' but only implanted, replicants subjectivize themselves by way of combining these memories into an individual myth, a narrative which allows them to construct their place in the symbolic universe. (Žižek, 1993)

The basic characteristic that makes the replicants to seem like human beings is their ability to create an individual story out of implanted memories. Human beings maintain their ability to integrate the elements of the symbolic in an individual way and it is what Žižek terms the "Self", what he defines as "the centre of narrative gravity." (Žižek, 1998)

4. SYMBOLIC SUBMISSION THROUGH IDENTIFICATION WITH EGO IDEAL

Reading Žižek, Tony Myers notes that while a subject enters the symbolic Order, “the Real of enjoyment or *jouissance* has to be evacuated from it” (p. 96); the process of signification, as the first step into symbolic order, does not evacuate enjoyment completely. Žižek comments:

And the Real cannot be signified not because it is outside, external to the symbolic order, but precisely because it is inherent to it, its internal limit the Real is the internal stumbling block on account of which the symbolic system can never become itself, achieve its self-identity. Because of its absolute immanence to the symbolic, the Real cannot be positively signified. (Žižek, 2000b)
In other words, the most of jouissance is not symbolized in the process of transference from the Real to symbolic order. In this regard, “the symbolic order cannot fully account for enjoyment” -something is missing from the big Other. Therefore, the big Other is split or structured around a lack, the lack of enjoyment. It is, might be possible to say, castrated or rendered incomplete by admitting the subject in much the same way as the subject is castrated by its admission. Žižekian fantasy is a way to manage or domesticate the traumatic loss of the enjoyment, which cannot be symbolized (ibid, p. 97). According to Ryan (2010), “our sense of selves” is constructed in our fantasy. In addition, through fantasy, we manage our loss of enjoyment by our identifications with various symbolic entities, such as job titles, leisure activities, religious affiliations, nationalities, and value systems (p. 59). In his 1995 title The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek articulates that the split between the symbolic meaning of social ideals and the institutional ritual that holds these social ideals is the key to understand how the unconscious fantasy operates in political ideologies. As it has been discussed previously, the Other is the entire chain of socio-cultural rules and customs. Žižek understands identity and symbolic identification in Lacanian psychoanalysis lens. Žižek believes that the subject is “decentred” because its most important symbolic identifications are with external social ideals that are “experienced as an order (the big Other) which is minimally reified, externalized” (Žižek, 2007). In addition, in Plague of Fantasies (1997), Žižek works on the view that what subjects know, feel, and desire is decentred. Then, he contends that individuals’ conscious self-identity is built upon a passionate link to the Other that is unconscious.

In How to Read Lacan, Žižek (2007) elucidates the central distinction between the Ideal Other of the symbolic order (the Ego Ideal) and the superego of the Real:

The Ego-Ideal is the agency whose gaze I try to impress with my ego image, the big Other who watches over me and propels me to give my best, the ideal I try to follow and actualize; and the superego is this same agency in its revengeful, sadistic, punishing, aspect. The underlying structuring principle of these three terms is clearly Lacan’s triad Imaginary-Symbolic-Real: ideal ego is imaginary, what Lacan calls the “small other,” the idealized double-image of my ego; Ego-Ideal is symbolic, the point of my symbolic identification, the point in the big Other from which I observe (and judge) myself; superego is real, the cruel and insatiable agency which bombards me with impossible demands and which mocks my failed attempts to meet them, the agency in the eyes of which I am all the more guilty, the more I try to suppress my “sinful” strivings and meet its demands. (p. 80)

Žižek makes a distinction between "ideal ego" and "ego ideal. The former relates to the imaginary category of human experience, the latter involves symbolic identification. To elaborate this more real, he recalls the famous example of crippled boy who identifies himself with a well-known player he watches on the television, imagining himself “in his place,” acting ‘through’ him, and “getting satisfaction from his triumphs.” The boy achieves “satisfaction through imaginary identification with the other,” his ideal ego observed on screen (Žižek, 2000a). On the other hand, if the basketball player himself can shine in the game in such a way that the big Other sees him, a
third gaze (Other’s gaze) will oppose to ideal ego; this third gaze is the ego ideal. Therefore, the ego ideal is the outlook from or in which the subject would like to be seen as the person one hopes to be. The most important point is that the Ego Ideal, as its name suggests, involves the dimension of the symbolic order. A person’s Ego Ideal is some idea rather than any specific person with which the process of identification is achieved (Sharpe & Boucher, pp. 48-9).

The point to be taken is that, for Žižek, successful political ideologies necessarily refer to and turn around sublime objects posited by political ideologies (Žižek, 1995). These sublime objects are what political subjects take it that the central words of regime’s ideologies, transgress ordinary moral laws, and lay down their lives. The most important and central element in the operation of Ego Ideals in a symbolic order is a sublime object of ideology, clearly:

To grasp this fully, we have only to remember the above-mentioned example of ideological 'quilting': in the ideological space float signifiers like 'freedom', 'state', 'justice', 'peace' [...] and then their chain is supplemented with some master-signifier ('Communism') which retroactively determines their (Communist) meaning: 'freedom' is effective only through surmounting bourgeois formal freedom, which is merely a form of slavery; the 'state' is the means by which the ruling class guarantees the conditions of its rule; market exchange cannot be 'just and equitable' because the very form of equivalent exchange between labour and capital implies exploitation; 'war' is inherent to class society as such; only the socialist revolution can bring about lasting 'peace', and so forth. (Žižek, 1995)

Borrowing a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari, Jameson (1984) defines ‘postmodernism’ as a breakdown of the signifying chain. It is similar to Žižek’s argumentation that all we have with the chain of signification (symbolic order) is a series of free-floating, unchained, signifiers. Nevertheless, the Master-Signifier is that which 'quilts', all of the ‘proto-ideological’ parts into a unified field of meaning. Therefore, as Ernesto Laclau suggests, empty signifiers (the Lacanian Master-Signifier) are important for hegemony, or ideology in Žižekian way (Laclau, 1996). Master-Signifier is the signifier “for which all the others represent the subject,” assigning subjects their positions in the Symbolic order. It is the signifier that masks the subject in the structure and is the signifier (Master-Signifier) that represents the subject (subject for another signifier (symbolic order) (Žižek, 2002). It holds the sociocultural totality by giving the subject a position in society, a symbolic position with authority (Sharpe & Boucher, p. 50). It has been argued that although the subject may be aware of whom they would like to be (their ideal ego); symbolic identification is a decentred process because Ego Ideal is unconscious. As an example, the classic instances of the big Other are God and Fate. By engaging in the rituals of the Christian Church, the subject identifies symbolically with the figure of Jesus. Thus, “this Ego Ideal holds the place, for the subject, of God, and it assigns the subject a place in the totality of Creation with a definite social mandate (as a believer supposed to love thy neighbour and obey God’s commandments)” (Sharpe & Boucher, p. 52). Žižek puts forward that the fundamentally unconscious component of this set of beliefs concerns what God enjoys or what is satisfying for God about the behavior of the faithful Christian.
In this procedure, a “central aspect of ideology is the production of this fantasy that the Ideal Other (Ego Ideal) controls our fate” (ibid, p. 160). It is clear that fantasy supports the relationship between symbolic order and the Real. Fantasy supports of ideology and establishes the co-ordinates in which subjects imagine that their position in the symbolic order is valid.

5. ACT: SUBJECT’S RE-BIRTH

As it has already been explained, Žižek reexamines the Marxist concept of ideology in the lens of Lacanian camera. For Žižek, ideology is not what we know but what we do. It is manifested in the practices and behaviors in which we carry on regularly, even as we know better. In addition, it has been clarified how Žižek uses the Lacanian psychoanalysis to show ideologies of political regimes, and the way they identify subjects. He believes that the primary feature of postmodernism is that, “it tries to dispense with the agency of the Master-Signifier,” and this, as a result, “leaves as the only agency of ideological interpellation the ‘unnameable’ abyss of jouissance: the ultimate injunction that regulates our lives in ‘postmodernity’ is [the superego command] ‘Enjoy!’” (Žižek, 2008) The economist, Lebow (1955) believes:

Our enormously productive economy demands that we make consumption our way of life, that we convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual satisfaction and our ego satisfaction in consumption. We need things consumed, burned up, worn out, replaced and discarded at an ever-increasing rate. (p. 20)

Consumerism, as leitmotif in postmodern culture, appears to have become part of the very fabric of modern life. Various social aspects of life, which did not need the marketplace previously, including religion, have had to adapt to a world, where consumers demand repeatedly (Miles, 1998). Žižek maintains that consumerism has been grabbed our interest with different rituals. Skillful advertisers sell us products by associating them with images of social success. Therefore, Consumerism admires a mode of false enlightenment, one that objectifies us as what we might term enjoying animals rather than encouraging the autonomous subjectivity enshrined in liberal philosophy (Žižek, 1993).

It sounds as if subjects need a kind of re-birth to crush this dilemma. The re-birth should involve a total rejection of the existing symbolic order and of the symbolic authorisation or role assumed for the subject. Žižek avers this re-birth is done only by an act:

The act differs from an active intervention (action) in that it radically transforms its bearer (agent): the act is not simply something I 'accomplish'-after an act, I’m literally 'not the same as before'. In this sense, we could say that the subject 'undergoes' the act ('passes through' it) rather than 'accomplishes' it: in it, the subject is annihilated and subsequently reborn (or not), i.e., the act involves a kind of temporary eclipse, aphanisis, of the subject. (Žižek, 1992)

In other words, the only way out is a radical revolutionary act that rejects or traverses all the founding assumptions of the existing ideological regime with its undergirding political fantasies. In a way, therefore, the act is a kind of attacking at oneself, a form of symbolic suicide. For example,
in Bryan Singer’s film *The Usual Suspects* (1995) the scene which Keyser Soze’s family is held by a rival gang, the key moment that makes him an eternal character is when he makes the insane decision of shooting what is dearest to him -his family- instead of being arrested. This act enables him to massacre the rival gang and all they hold dearest to them. In this regard, Žižek claims, “this act, far from amounting to a case of impotent aggressivity turned against oneself, rather changes the co-ordinates of the situation in which the subject finds himself” (Žižek, 2000b). For Žižek, the best political behavior in such a situation is a political act that terminates the basic ideology of a symbolic order. Act revolts and replaces the old symbolic fantasy with a new symbolic fantasy. Sharpe and Boucher comment:

As for many other contemporary theorists, for him politics proper in the last instance involves or invokes the arbitrary decision that founds a political community upon a social ideal or form of the highest good, but that also represses into the political unconscious the fundamental social fantasy of that political community. (Sharpe & Boucher, p. 170)

The destruction of the subject’s fantasy in the act is strictly correlative to Hegel’s “night of the world.” For Hegel the mere gesture of subjectivity is “the night of the world,” thus, the act is a return to that gesture, a reinvention from founding moment of the subject (Myers, p. 60). Butler (2005) believes that this aspect of act makes the impossibilities achievable, no more than “the actualization of an already existing possibility” (p. 67). As Žižek affirms:

An act does not occur *within* the given horizon of what appears to be ‘possible’ - it redefines the very contours of what is possible (an act accomplishes what, within the given symbolic universe, appears to be ‘impossible’, yet it changes its conditions so that it creates retroactively the conditions of its own possibility). (Žižek, 2000a)

The last result of the West for removing the false enlightenment of Consumerism is act, which is the negation that speaks freely about a re-birth. Žižek calls scholars to reject the “conditions of possibility of postmodernity” in order to resolve the predicaments of the postmodern subject, or change “the horizon in which these predicaments make sense” (Myers 60).

### 6. CONCLUSION

For Žižek, the concept of fantasy has a significant role in symbolic Submission and freedom; moreover, it does not include what we would describe as daydreams. This essay functions as an anatomy of fantasy, exposing the process by which subjects of symbolic order are constructed, then it enlists subjects’ cooperation in their own submission or freedom. The investigation examines subjects and the big Other. It analyzes the ways different ideas help the big Other to identify characters with the symbolic order’s values. The evidences of this research shows that language is a powerful tool to form human behaviors, beliefs, and finally their identity within a symbolic order. The process of subject’s enslavement into language and to the rest of the symbolic order is called subjectivization by Žižek. It is argued that the logics of this process (subjectivization) ultimately do have a political bearing. There is indeed for Žižek an intimate connection between symbolic identity and the founding imposition of language. Therefore, subjectivization involves the
cooperation of the “hegemonic ideology of society to such an extent that ideology becomes invisible and seems natural” (Myers, 2003). Another obvious finding emerged from this study is that the symbolic order continues its livelihood by identifying subjects with Ego Ideals in the field of fantasy. As Žižek announces the fantasy of a subject manages or domesticates the traumatic loss of enjoyment, which cannot be symbolized (Žižek, 1997a). Here, fantasy operates in filling the split between the symbolic meaning of social ideals and the institutional ritual that holds these social ideals in political ideologies. The symbolic order refers to different figures to present Ego Ideals for the subjects. This referred figures are the concern of “symbolic, the point of symbolic identification, the point in the big Other” from which the Handmaids observe and judge themselves. These Ego Ideals are the agencies whose gaze the subjects “try to impress with their ego image, the big Other who watches over” them and propels them to give their best, “the ideal they try to follow and actualize” (Žižek, 2007). Finally, the results of this thesis indicate that some subjects do not fully identify with symbolic order’s fantasy, this is why, for them, it is easier to acquire a distance towards fantasy, to traverse it. They traverses their ideological fantasy and accepts the nonexistence of the big Other. In their act, they manipulate “the graphic presentation of the relation between signifier and signified” (Žižek, 1995). Radical act, here, explicitly challenges the founding assumptions of the existing ideological order, with its undergirding political fantasies (Žižek, 1997b). Act, as a negation that opens up the possibility of re-birth, changes its conditions so that it creates retroactively the conditions of its own possibility (Žižek, 2000a). We can never fully predicts the consequences of act because by the very nature of an act, of course, Žižek cannot predict what the symbolic order would look like after an act, or what future is waiting for act.

REFERENCES
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